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WRITING THE LAW OF LATIN AMERICA
JORGE L. ESQUIROL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Latin America scholars have largely neglected the constructivist
role of legal discourse as it relates to the region's national legal
systems. This dimension of law includes the range of traditional
legal scholarship in all its various stripes. It also extends to other
forms of legal writing, including expert consultant reports, multi-
disciplinary studies, and transnational work. An example of the lat-
ter is Lesley McAllister's Making Law Matter: Environmental Protection
and Legal Institutions in Brazil, featured in this symposium edition.'
The present Essay-while not a review of her book-explores the
broader area in which she writes: namely, Latin American legal
transnationalism. My general observations of the field, here, are
not meant as specific comments on Professor McAllister's work.
Rather, at certain points, I refer to sections of her book as exam-
ples of the ways in which transnational scholars grapple with some
of the issues identified below.
My primary objective is to examine several characteristic limita-
tions of contemporary transnational writing on law in Latin
America. Indeed, this George Washington International Law Review
symposium offers a welcome opportunity to reflect on legal trans-
nationalism. 2 Certainly, writing about law in Latin America takes
many different approaches, positions, and styles. Much of this is
no doubt idiosyncratic to individual authors. At the same time,
much of this literature fits quite a similar form. Disappointingly,
the tendency is to replay a standard set of conventions, surface
explanations, and general diagnoses of the problem of law in Latin
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1. LErY MCALIusTER, MAKING LAW MATrER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL (2008).
2. See Symposium, Rainforests and Regulation: New Directions in Brazilian Environmental
Law and Legal Institutions, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. RaV. 611 (2009).
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America. This rather reduced spectrum is surely due to the nor-
mal difficulties attendant to comparative work, such as language
barriers, stylistic differences, institutional dissimilarities, and func-
tional disanalogies. Transnational commentators are certainly
faced with a difficult task.
Yet, beyond the basic constraints, certain epistemic disconnects
also limit wider engagement. Simply put, certain idges fixes and
automatic reflexes have the effect of truncating fuller debate over
questions of law in Latin America. The former significantly dis-
places wider discussions over alternative policies, competing inter-
ests, and the distributional impact of rules and institutions.
Transnationalism, advanced in this way, privileges a narrow set of
diagnoses, positions, and prescriptions. Rather than breadth,
transparency, and alternatives, the commonly accepted forms limit
the very contribution of transnationalists. Some of these same dis-
connects may be perceived in comparative work generally or in
relation to other places. Nonetheless, the combination of conven-
tions described in more detail below is particularly salient with
respect to Latin America.
Of course, contestable generalizations, distorting simplifications,
and unconscious projections are inevitable features of any commu-
nicative form-especially across wide power differentials. Turned
into convention, however, their repeated reassertion solidifies a
skewed perception, in this case of law in Latin America. 3 The over-
all impact, as it turns out, is fewer legal-institution-building benefits
than could be expected from international expert attention and
resources expended on the region. Certainly, a tandem practice of
persistent critique may, in specific cases, provide a corrective of
sorts. This Essay, itself, could be seen as such an example. My aim,
though, is not simply a round of criticism and re-representation in
the same mode. Rather, I propose to identify specific limitations of
the prevailing transnationalism that have the effect of narrowing
engagement and privileging the legal politics and policies within
the dominant channels. A more engaged transnationalism could,
potentially, better contribute to the collective construction, demo-
cratic reform, and ultimately acceptable performance of institu-
tions in the area. Indeed, I argue here, transnational writing
practices with respect to Latin America need not always be nega-
3. See generally JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM (2006) (celebrating the multiplicity and incommensurability of theory).
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tive, even though they may immediately suggest an Orientalizing,
neocolonial, and hegemonic structure. 4
Notably, this Essay does not advocate any single methodology or
critique related to law. It also does not argue the relative practical
or political relevance of any one type of legal debate. Rather, I
take the perspective that writing about law and legal institutions is
constitutive of our knowledge about them and is inseparable from
their operation. Legal writing shapes both the views and options of
operators within and outside those entities. It also contributes sig-
nificantly to the social construction of "law-ness"-by which I mean
the general perception of law in a given society. In these multiple
ways, legal discourse plays a significant role.
II. BACKGROUND
By way of background, traditional legal scholarship assumes cer-
tain dominant modes in specific places. In broad strokes, in Latin
America-as is typical of the civil law model-the work of legal
scholars comprises a formal element of those systems. 5 The writ-
ings of distinguished jurists in the form of textbooks, treatises,
commentaries, and articles are a subsidiary source of law.6 The doc-
trine-as it is known-varies from more literal expositions of the
positive law to ones that are less so.7 Such legal writing is ranked
along an informal hierarchy. The most prominent works appear in
legal textbooks and are studied in law schools. 8 Such views greatly
structure legal reasoning and shape the boundaries of legal institu-
tions. The most common critiques of this civil-law scholarship-
and civilian legal reasoning generally-stress its excessive reliance
on logical rationalism and conceptual formalism and the relative
absence of contextual considerations. 9 This general mode is quite
4. See generally EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALisM 201-20 (1979), Lama Abu-Odeh, The Polit-
ics of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy in American Academia, 52 Am. J. CoMp. L. 789
(2004); Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002);
5. SeeJOHN DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 395 (1968); RENt DAVID &JOHN E.C.
BRIE LY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 147 (1988);JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN &
ROGELIO PtREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL Sys-
TEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 57, 60 (2007);John Henry Merryman, The Italian Style
I: Doctrine, 18 STAN. L. REV. 39, 42-43 (1965-66);
6. MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 5, at 60.
7. See id. at 56-67; DAWSON, supra note 5, at 386-400.
8. See MERRYMAN & PRREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 5, at 60; ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING
OF THE CIVIL LAW 168-74 (1981).
9. DAVID & BRIERLY, supra note 5, at 149; MERRvMAN & P9REZ-PERDOMO, supra note 5,
at 62-63; Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 32
STAN. J. INT'L L. 65, 76-77 (1996).
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typically contrasted to legal analysis that is more transparent in
addressing law's policies and purposes. Notably, though, the char-
acteristics of specific places have much to do with the variety and
shape of locally accepted modes of authoritative writing. European
authors-as is well-known-are a significant source of law in Latin
America, but they are by no means the only source.10 Reflecting
much more particularity, legal debate is structured in quite distinct
ways in national and other forums."
By comparison, in the United States, legal scholarship performs
a somewhat different yet analogous function. It is not a source of
law per se. Still, courts cite specific works to support a novel pro-
position or background theory.1 2 Law school casebooks routinely
include excerpts of legal articles. 13 And advanced law courses and
seminars are based on the most cutting-edge examples. Legal prac-
titioners also make use of scholarly writing for general background,
updates on new developments, and ideas for novel theories about a
case.
Mainstream writing is often critiqued as either too superficial or,
conversely, too theoretical.' 4 For some critics, legal writing fails to
advance far enough into the stuff of analysis. 15 In the United
States, much legal writing is limited to "case crunching," tinkering
at the margins of policy and reform, and reinforcing liberal legal-
ism. 16 On the other end of the spectrum, for other critics, much
contemporary legal writing tends to be largely irrelevant, difficult
to understand, and overly theoretical.1 7 And, in fact, analyses and
proposals straying more than a comfortable distance from main-
stream positions are quite unlikely to be taken up by courts or
practitioners.
Transnational legal writing, in turn, has some distinct features.
In its simplest terms, it can consist of conventional works of com-
10. See generally ANGEL OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAW (2006).
11. See generally DIEGO LOPEZ-MEDINA, TEORfA IMPURA DEL DERECHO: LA TRANSFORMA-
CION DE LA CULTURAJURiDICA LATINOAMERICANA (2004).
12. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED
STATES 83-89 (1996).
13. See Bethany Rubin Henderson, Asking the Lost Question: What is the Purpose of Law
School?, 53J. LEGAL EDUC. 48, 66-67 (2003).
14. See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?
(1996) [hereinafter UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?]; Roberto Mangabeira
Unger, Legal Analysis as Institutional Imagination, 59 MoD. L. REv. 1 (1996) [hereinafter
Unger, Institutional Imagination]; Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction in LEFT LEGAL-
ISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 1, 25-33 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
15. See generally UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?, supra note 14.
16. See, e.g., Unger, Institutional Imagination, supra note 14, at 17.
17. See, e.g. Brown & Halley, supra note 14, at 25-33.
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parative law, foreign law, or legal area studies. Transnational schol-
arship along these lines typically serves the purpose of informing a
home audience about another legal system. It can also provide
arguments for or against particular proposals of law reform or insti-
tutional redesign-at least in jurisdictions receptive to foreign
experiences. Moreover, transnational commentary may supply
legal practitioners with needed information about foreign rules
and procedures applicable to a multiple jurisdiction case or trans-
action. It informs the substance of expert testimony on foreign
law.18 In international development and aid contexts, it can signifi-
cantly form the basis of country reports, project proposals, and per-
formance assessments. 19 By using the term "transnational," I do
not mean to invoke a methodological difference, such as distinc-
tions among functionalism, thick description, or side-by-side tex-
tual comparison.20 This is not an endorsement of a particular
method.21 It is also not meant to describe a separate body of law,
such as a realm of norms straddling national and international
law.22 Rather, my intention is to draw the widest net possible on
writing about law in Latin America from a transnational
perspective.
III. LEGAL TRANsNATIoNALIsM
Legal transnationalism, in the sense meant here, refers to a dis-
cursive construct. It is sustained by transnational legal writing that
simultaneously describes and creates a relationship between differ-
ent legal systems. It also incorporates legal writing not primarily
18. See generally Carolyn B. Lamm & Y. Elizabeth Tang, Rule 44.1 and Proof of Foreign
Law in Federal Court, 30 LITIG. 31 (2003-04).
19. See generally MARIA DAKOLIAS, THE JUDICIAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CAR-
IBBEAN: ELEMENTS OF REFORM Xi (1996); LINN A. HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE
AND JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: THE PERUVIAN CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(1998); WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN
AMERICA: DECLINING CONFIDENCE IN THE RULE OF LAw 3 (2000); JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL
REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA (Edmundo Jarquin & Fernando Carrillo eds., 1998); LAS
REFORMAS PROCESALES PENALES EN AMERICA LATINA (2005); THE RULE OF LAw IN LATIN
AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM 4-5 (Pilar Domingo &
Rachel Sieder eds., 2001); THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN
AMERICA (Juan E. M~ndez, Guillermo O'Donnell & Paulo Sergio Pinheiro eds., 1999).
20. See generally Gfinter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law,
26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 425-40 (1985).
21. Compare Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational
Law, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 65, 75-78 (1996) (arguing for a law-and-society approach).
22. Compare Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT'L L.
REv. 745, 745-47 (2005-06). "Transnational law represents a kind of hybrid between
domestic and international law that can be downloaded, uploaded, or transplanted from
one national system to another." Id. at 753.
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concerned with a foreign locale but that is, nonetheless, rendered
relevant and even influential as a result of the connection. In this
context, legal transnationalism in Latin America can be grouped,
primarily, into separate U.S. and European axes. Some of the
points made in this Essay are common to both. Yet, each has a
somewhat different relationship to national legal systems in the
region.
Succinctly, European transnationalism has been especially sali-
ent in jurisprudential and positive law projects over most of the
twentieth century, premised on the historical and continuing con-
nections of continental European and Latin American states.23
Traditional comparativists sustain this paradigm by reaffirming
Latin America's essentially Continental European law. Moreover,
the shape of this form of transnationalism derives chiefly from the
very hierarchy that gives it its impetus. Latin American legal sys-
tems figure as junior members within the civilian legal family and
are thus understood as simple receivers or imitators of European
legal production. 24 As such, European authorities not principally
or even marginally concerned with Latin America furnish much of
the terms of national legal discourse in the region.
At the same time, this mode of transnationalism offers certain
advantages to legal operators in Latin America. It provides ostensi-
bly nonpolitical and universal-like sources of law and legal reason-
ing.25 It also introduces the legal production of continental
Europe as prime material for national legal debate. A "European-
style" intervention within legal discourse in Latin America rou-
tinely takes one of the following forms: an annotative approach list-
ing all the countries where a certain European model has or has
not been adopted;26 a sociological turn tracking divergences from
original models and describing the operation of informal or living
law;2 7 or a discursive tack combining select European authorities to
support particular legal positions within national debates.2 8
My focus in this Essay, though, is principally on U.S.-Latin Amer-
ican legal relations. The prominence of this U.S.-legal transnation-
23. See generally Jorge L. Esquirol, Fictions of Latin American Law (Part 1), 1997 UTAH L.
REV. 425 (1997) [hereinafter Esquirol, Fictions].
24. See generally RENE DAVID, L'ORIGINALITP DES DROITS DE L'AMtRIQUE LATINE (1956).
25. See Esquirol, Fictions, supra note 23.
26. See generally Alejandro Garro, Shaping the Content of a Basic Course on Latin American
Legal Systems, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 595 (1988).
27. See generally DERECHO V SOCIEDAD EN AMtRICA LATINA: UN DEBATE SOBRE LOS
ESTUDIOS JURiDICOS CRiTICOS, (Chsar Rodriguez y Mauricio Garcia, eds., ILSA 2003).
28. See generally LOPEZ-MEDINA, supra note 11.
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alism is a relatively recent phenomenon. Of course, the regional
influence of U.S. law, especially public law, dates back to well into
the nineteenth century.2 9 The current, more subsidized version
originates in Cold War politics and the 1960s Alliance for Progress
attempt to keep Latin America within the U.S. sphere of influence.
Specifically, the period of "law and development" of the 1960s and
1970s was the high point of U.S. scholarly attention and commen-
tary on law in the region. In fact, some of the enduring perspec-
tives and parameters of the ensuing transnational relationship were
forged in this era.30 The neoliberal round of development of the
1980s and 1990s also trained significant attention on law in Latin
America. This second time, it took less the form of scholarly works
than expert-panel country reports, project proposals by consulting
firms, and agency and foundation project evaluations. 31 Many of
these have included collaboration by experts and academics based
in Latin America. 32 Since the 1990s, international agencies, the
U.S. government, and private foundations have continued to sup-
port legal reforms, with possibly less emphasis on neoliberal pre-
scriptions and greater focus on social-justice concerns. 33
In brief, this sort of transnationalism appears oriented along
three principal lines. National legal systems in Latin America are
illiberal or failed versions of modern law. 34 Informal or social
norms are more representative of people's actual conduct than for-
mal state law.35 And legal reform with better liberal models is
needed to generate development and democracy.3 6 In sum, not so
unlike European transnationalism in a certain way, this paradigm
offers an ostensibly nonpolitical mode of pursuing legal change
and a near-universal goal. Certain legal projects can, as such, lay
29. See MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 5; see also Jacob Dolinger, The Influ-
ence of American Constitutional Law on the Brazilian Legal System, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 803
(1990).
30. SeeJohn Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style,
Decline, and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 484-89
(1977) (Appendix A: Bibliography of Works on Law & Development).
31. SeeJorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 AM. J. ComP. L. 75, 94-95
(2008) [hereinafter Esquirol, Failed Law].
32. See Mdximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of
Legal Ideas ftom the Periphery, 54 AM. J. Comp. L. 617, 651 (2007).
33. Kerry Ritttich, The Future of Law and Development: Second-Generation Reforms and the
Incorporation of the Social, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 203, 203-52 (D.
Trubek & A. Santos eds., 2006).
34. See Esquirol, Failed Law, supra note 31.
35. SeeJorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REv. 41
(2003) [hereinafter Esquirol, Continuing Fictions].
36. See Esquirol, Failed Law, supra note 31; Esquirol, Continuing Fictions, supra note 35.
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claim to rather unopposable-yet indeterminately vague-asser-
tions of development and democracy. And elevated by transna-
tional standing, these positions may more easily override
alternative legal-political interests at the national level not backed
in the same way.
This paradigm of legal transnationalism is also maintained-for
the most part indirectly-by work on law and legal institutions in
other academic disciplines. 37 Area studies and comparative politics
at U.S. universities, in particular, have been a principal vehicle.
Notably, an increasing number of Latin American-origin scholars
and practitioners have come to fill these ranks, contributing to aca-
demic journals and conferences, as well as development project
teams, country reports, and U.S.-government-sponsored missions.
Graduate students from Latin America, some of them staying in
academic or other positions in the United States, also contribute
significantly. 38 Taken together, all of these generate a continuing
stream of legal writing and a field of discourse that is the focus of
this Essay.
Transnationalism, thus broadly understood, may serve a number
of functions not usually considered. It adds more "participants" to
the work of national legal institutions. It provides additional
authorities for legal change. It may serve to reinforce a particular
paradigm of legal reasoning. And it may reproduce a conceptual
arrangement advancing certain interests and limiting others. Addi-
tionally, more critical transnationalists may also challenge the
parameters of available options, frameworks, and limitations of law
and legal institutions. In certain cases, the blind spots, structural
biases, and unintended ill-effects of dominant legal prescriptions-
and their proponents-may be more easily explored from a trans-
national vantage point. Furthermore, these perspectives and inter-
locutors may contribute to fuller consideration of resource
allocation, priorities, incentives, and distributional consequences
of specific rules and institutional designs. As such, the transna-
tional field-more realistically perceived-is simply another arena
in which political positions compete, albeit in differently styled and
frequently obscure ways.
37. See, e.g., La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, Law and Finance, 106J. POL.
EcON. 6 (1998); Guillermo O'Donnell, Why the Rule of Law Matters, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 32
(2004).
38. Marta Vides de Gonzdlez, Manuel G6mez, Luis P~rez-Hurtado, The American Way:
Los Abogados Latinoamericanos como Estudiantes de Maestrfa en Estados Unidos de Amrica
(2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (confirming sense of increased
numbers and stays in the United States).
[Vol. 40
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A. Limited Engagement
The dominant U.S.-Latin America transnationalism, however, is
quite limited by its own conventions. This is not an empirical
claim. It is based on the particularities of the field described
below. The effects are considerable though. It forces legal-politi-
cal questions through the prism of accepted conventions and the
current geopolitics of knowledge, suppressing certain interests and
broader consideration. 39 Moreover, in light of vast economic and
political differentials, writing from the center (literally or figura-
tively) intrinsically carries great weight and capacity to shape inter-
national action. Thus, its representations impact the attitudes and
policies that powerful U.S. and international entities may adopt.
This impact is not limited to transnational audiences. It has the
capacity to impress certain beliefs inordinately on commented-
upon societies about their own systems of law.
Concretely, U.S.-Latin American legal transnationalism is gener-
ally limited to a circumscribed set of modes.40 Exchanges over law
in Latin America typically consist of the following: comparing laws
and legal institutions (explicitly or implicitly) to the presumed work-
ings of law elsewhere, especially the United States; 41 contrasting
39. See UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LECAL ANALYSIS BECOME?, supra note 14, at 131. Some-
what parallel, Unger identifies:
The preconceptions to be replaced negate the possibility or the significance of
criticism [defined as comparing existing arrangements with the goals they both
frustrate and make real.] Such preconceptions present the greater part of any
extended and received body of law and legal understandings as an expression of a
cohesive moral and political vision, or a set of practical necessities, or of a lawlike
evolutionary sequence.
Id.
40. While my claims here extend to work on Latin America generally, the footnotes
immediately below focus on a random sample of recent U.S. law review articles on Brazil
specifically (the setting of Professor McAllister's book). Compare AIJAZ AH AD, IN THEORY-
CLASSES, NATIONS, LITERATURES 183 (1992) (critiquing Edward Said's Orientalism for
reverse-Orientalizing the same discourse he critiques. Ahmad's objection-responding in
my own defense in this Essay-can be understood as specific to Said's zeal in tracing Orien-
talism throughout all periods and all disciplinary canons of a common and uninterrupted
European identity-as-difference from the "Orient," all the way back to Greek Antiquity.
Additionally, describing a phenomenon-ineluctably through the use of concepts and
generalizations as I do here-is different than replicating the hegemonically institutional-
ized set of generalizations, simplifications and projections described in the text.).
41. See Matthew S. Poulter, My Client's Going to Brazil: A U.S. Practitioner's Guide to Brazil-
ian Limitadas under the New Civil Code, 11 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 133 (2005) (comparison of
2002 New Civil Code provisions of Brazilian "sociedades limitadas" to U.S. limited liability
companies); John C. Tucker & Mark A. Brown, Comparative Analysis of Pesticide Regulatory
Programs in the United States and Brazi4 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 81 (1995) (argu-
ing for greater U.S. regulation of pesticide exports, based on perceived higher incidence of
human poisoning in Parana, Brazil than in Florida, U.S.A. despite similar procedural and
substantive regulation. Poisoning data was based on 1982 to 1991 figures of pesticide
The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. [Vol. 40
idealized legal models with actual material conditions on the
ground;42 finding a lack of "penetration" of formal law in local soci-
eties and highlighting the prevalence, instead, of different infor-
mal and social norms; 43 and diagnosing systemic deficiencies based
on the self-legitimating ideology of legal liberalism. 44 Much of this
poisoning reporting program conducted by Public Prosecutor's office of the State of
Parana and, on the U.S. side, a phone interview with an official at the Florida Department
of Agriculture and Consumer Services reporting 1994 figures.)
42. See Mariana Mota Prado, The Challenges and Risks of Creating Independent Regulatory
Agencies: A Cautionary Tale from Brazil, VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 (2008) (claiming the
failure of internationally-prescribed and U.S.-modeled independent regulatory agencies
because "they are not as insulated from electoral cycles and the political sphere as they are
perceived or expected to be."); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Relearning Brown: Applying the
Lessons of Brown to the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century: To Be Brown in Brazil: Education
and Segregation Latin American Style, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 683 (2005) (advocat-
ing the value of an "anti-caste" interpretation of Brown v. Board of Education to Afro-Brazil-
ian activists - despite noting significant differences of context such as widespread facial
integration and likely rejection by Afro-Brazilian activists); Lesley K McAllister, Judging
GMO's:Judicial Application of the Precautionary Principle in Brazil, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 149 (2005)
(advocating the model of procedural "hard-look" doctrine of U.S. environmental law, in
precautionary principle cases, in Brazilian courts); Alexandre Tadeu Seguim, LLM Perspec-
tive: New Transfer Pricing Rules in Brazil, 19 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 394, 395-96 (1999) (argu-
ing that Brazil's 1996 transfer pricing law "exhibits a clear misreading of the concept" -
such concept according to the author means essentially the view of the 1979 OECD Report
on Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises that "transfer pricing is a mechanism
designed only to avoid taxes is misleading. Actually, to transfer price is a sound and posi-
tive way to increase value."); Paulina L. Jerez, Proposed Brazilian Money Laundering Legisla-
tion: Analysis and Recommendations, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L & POL'Y 329, 352 (1997) (arguing for
U.S.-backed money-laundering legislation in Brazil, despite acknowledging it may result in
harm to Brazilian economy yet making no note of possible alternatives or internal debates
in Brazil: "Nonetheless, the United States views these laws as a desirable and necessary step
to combat money laundering.").
43. See Erica Gorga, Culture and Corporate Law Reform: A Case Study of Brazil, 27 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 803, 812, 824 (2006) (arguing Brazil's 2001 corporate law reform failed due
to Brazilian cultural acquiescence to excessive controlling shareholder/executive personal
use of corporate assets, as opposed to the presumed situation in the United States: "the
'patrimonial' and 'personal' culture, deep-seated in Brazil for centuries, is a crucial factor
that restrains the development of the capital markets... A distinguishing cultural feature
of Brazilian entrepreneurs is that they tend to extract not only pecuniary benefits, but also,
and above all, non-pecuniary benefits of their ownership."); Gesner Oliveira and Thomas
Fujiwara, Competition Policy in Developing Economies: The Case of Brazil, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 619, 640-41 (2006) (advocating the creation of "competition values and culture" in
Brazil, in light of pending "reduction of bureaucracy" anti-trust legislation in the Brazilian
Congress).
44. See Cristina Schwansee Romano, The 1996 Brazilian Commercial Arbitration Law, 5
ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 27, 44 (1999) (supporting 1996 Brazilian arbitration law and
international commercial arbitration, based on "overcoming Brazil's deficiency in relation
to foreign law," the well-known deficiencies of its judiciary, and the inadequacy of the Civil
Codes and Code of Civil Procedure); Flavia Piovesan, Integrating Gender Perspective into Bra-
zilian Legal Doctrine and Education: Challenges and Possibilities, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y
& L. 251 (1998-99) (mobilizing tropes of formalism, contradictions, and anachronism of
the Brazilian legal culture to advocate greater attention to women's issues).
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work is certainly commendable and no doubt stems from earnest
and laudable objectives. Indeed, any one of these modes is quite
common to comparative law work, generally. Taken together and
circumscribed to these forms, however, the repeated practice of
these approaches consolidates a particular picture of law in Latin
America. Indeed, most interventions in the field simply reproduce
and reinforce this same basic paradigm. 45 Notably, they also rein-
force standard ideological beliefs about the operation of modern
liberal law in developed countries, and they serve to legitimate the
current geopolitical hierarchy of different national legal systems.
B. Mystifying and Exclusionary Politics
This construct turns actual legal debate in Latin America into an
obscure object of study rather than an arena of legal/political
struggle to be directly engaged. Indeed, in the ways described
below, U.S. transnationalism may actually foreclose more horizon-
tal and transparent engagement with the legal actors and the vari-
ety of political positions potentially supported in different places. 46
As a mode of intervening in legal politics, nonetheless, it is quite
effective. Indeed, its authority is based on the hierarchical political
economy of U.S.-Latin American legal relations, rather than an
open analysis of the range of interests concretely at stake in given
Latin American polities. Thus, this transnational paradigm more
characteristically preempts and displaces contending positions
than it does address them.
45. But see Colin Crawford and Guilherme Pignataro, The Insistent and (Unrelenting
Challenges) of Protecting Biodiversity in Brazil: Finding "The Law that Sticks, 39 U. Miami Inter-
Am. L. Rev. 1 (2007) (analyzing the pros, cons, and enforcement challenges of Brazil's
"National System of Conservation Units" legislation in 2000); Patricia Maria Basseto Aval-
lone, The Award of Punitive and Emotional Distress Damages in Breach of Contract Cases: A Com-
parison of the American and Brazilian Legal Systems, 8 NEW ENG. INT'L & COMp. L. ANN. 253,
270 (2002) (arguing against the formalistic distinction between tort and contract, common
to both Brazilian and U.S. law, to advocate for more "moral damages" awards in contract
cases: "This theme si (sic) emphasized both because of the importance of this remedy in
providing a fair and just system of compensation to a creditor, and because every day
breaches of contract constitute an offense to the moral patrimony of the persons, instead
of a mere offense to their pecuniary interests."); Stanley A. Gacek, Revisiting the Corporatist
and Contractualist Models of Labor Law Regimes: A Review of the Brazilian and American Systems,
16 CARDozo L. REv. 21 (1994) (comparing U.S. and Brazilian labor law and labor relations
to contractualist and corporatist models, respectively, as to likely levels of labor militancy);
Jacob Dolinger, Brazilian Supreme Court Solutions for Conflicts Between Domestic and Interna-
tional Law: An Exercise in Eclecticism, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 1041 (1993) (engaging a range of
positions on the question of direct applicability of international law within the Brazilian
legal system).
46. See Gayatri Chakavorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in COLONIAL DISCOURSE
AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY A READER 66, 90 (P. Williams & L. Chrisman eds., 1994).
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As such, in the context of the prevailing U.S. transnationalism,
the fuller range of legal/political positions remains relatively iso-
lated, paradoxically, in contexts of increasing internationalization
and transnational involvement. Indeed, powerful transnational
intervention in one legal struggle or another may squelch the rela-
tive strength, or even possibility of significant expression, of the
fuller range of interests affected. Engaging the wider gamut of
legal politics in Latin America is not typical of transnational analy-
ses. Nor is it on the agenda of formal hemispheric discussions on
trade or crime control, to take a couple of examples. 47 This mode
of transnationalism thus falls far short of responsive engagement
with legal actors in Latin America and horizontal participation in
the societal negotiations of national law and legal institutions.
C. Diverted Resources
This disjuncture of legal transnationalism is a missed opportu-
nity to reinforce the construction and consolidation of national
legal institutions through added global intellectual resources. The
epistemic and strategic divides foster distancing and projection.
Rather than broader and more extensive legal debate, edified
instead is an instrumental conception available for interjecting
legal change in the region, under the aegis of transnational knowl-
edge production. This is especially the case in a hierarchical rela-
tionship, such as the weight of U.S. intellectual and financial
resources trained on law and legal institutions in Latin America. 48
Thus, many of the benefits that sustained attention by a wider
group of participants could otherwise provide are diverted, at least
in terms of the wider goal of societal "law-ness" mentioned earlier
above.
IV. DISCIPLINARY CONVENTIONS
The dominant form of U.S. transnationalism is limited by the
default positions many comparativists and others repeatedly main-
tain about the region. 49 In the aggregate, this vision shapes devel-
47. See e.g. Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International Law Help?: An Analysis of the Colombian
Peace Process, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 23, 82-91 (2000) (arguing the priority of U.S. interests in
assistance to Colombia).
48. See generally JAMES GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAwYERs AND FOREIGN
AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980).
49. See Esquirol, Failed Law, supra note 31, at 76.
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opment assistance efforts and internationally subsidized law
reform. 50 Described below are some of its more salient features.
A. Idges fixes
The consolidation of certain idgesfixes about the object of study is
a significant stumbling block. Especially in a field covering twenty-
some countries over the full range of legal issues and institutions,
certain generalizations take precedence over more specific knowl-
edge of contexts and situations.51 In part, overarching frameworks
and generalities are the bread and butter of analytic work. At the
same time, however, they produce certain distortions and stereo-
types that are difficult to counteract and disentrench. The very
definition of an idge fixe is that it persists despite evidence to the
contrary.
1. Underdeveloped Law
The view of a backward or imitative law is one example of an idge
fixe. Law in the region is seen as a less advanced version of Euro-
pean or U.S. law and methods. One scholar explains the following:
[S]o many of Latin America's institutions and so much of its
legal doctrine are derived from foreign sources that it is argua-
ble that there is little point in focusing on Latin America in a
basic course in comparative law. The European countries have
produced incomparably richer source materials, both primary
and secondary.5 2
Furthermore, law in Latin America is generally viewed as contrib-
uting to lesser development, if not viewed itself as underdevel-
oped. 53 One example of such characterization is as follows:
The dominant perception is that Latin American countries, gen-
erally classed as underdeveloped and backward, lack a pattern of
social organization sufficiently cohesive to permit a minimum
basis for comparison of the role of legal institutions as an inte-
gral part of a culture. 54
50. Id.
51. See generally Esquirol, Fictions, supra note 23; Esquirol, Failed Law, supra note 31, at
75; Esquirol, Continuing Fictions, supra note 35.
52. Kenneth L. Karst, Teaching Latin American Law, 19 Am.J. COMP. L. 685, 685 (1971).
53. Contrast KENNETH KARST & KEITH ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
A .EiucA 6 (1975) (stating "the dizzying profusion of laws and lawyers suggests that a more
appropriate word for law in Latin America might be 'overdeveloped.'").
54. Garro, supra note 26, at 602.
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Weak economies and unstable democracies are linked to this
insufficient law. 55 Formal legality is thus cast as part of the prob-
lem. If anything, such insufficient law-so this thinking goes-
needs to be replaced with better legal methods and institutions. As
a result, it would appear completely nonsensical to engage actual
doctrinal texts, to master the genres of legal debate in Latin
America, or to act in relation to existing laws and institutions.
Instead, the focus has been to replace them with better methods
and forms. As a result, there is no apparent need to engage such
law's particularities in the many different national legal systems.
Rather, if anything, the study of European law and its authors is
deemed a sufficient complement to a common-law background for
understanding law in the region. Still today, for example, there
are few courses on law in Latin America taught in U.S. law
schools. 56 And some comparativists have even suggested that study-
ing French or German law is a more productive avenue for learn-
ing about law in the region. 57
Moreover, the legal similarities and differences across Latin
American countries are often viewed as, more than anything else,
reflecting different encroachments on a model "rule of law."5 8 As
such, they are described as illegitimate politics, alternative social
norms in place of law, evidence of clientelism, the gap between law
and society, happenstance historical features, or differences owing
to the prominence of certain individuals or events in a particular
country.59 In this way, it becomes possible to speak of a general
"Latin American law," although no such thing exists. 60 In the final
analysis, the operative meaning of the latter merely consists of the
region's shared shortcomings measured against projected ideal
types. Additionally, within this transnational field, no significant
intra-Latin American engagement exists, except for possibly the
55. See generally KARST & ROSENN, supra note 53; KENNETH KARST, LATIN AMERICAN
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1966).
56. MARISOL FLOREN-ROMERO, UNOFFICIAL SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA-RELATED LAW
COURSES AT ABA-AccREDITED (INCLUDING PROVISIONALLY ACCREDITED) U.S. LAW SCHOOLS
(EXCLUDING PUERTO RICO) (Sept. 2008) (on file with author) (out of 196 schools, 32 listed
at least one-very few listed more than one-course substantially on Latin America at their
home campus. This number does not indicate how often they are actually offered.).
57. See Garro, supra note 26, at 599-601.
58. See generally Guillermo O'Donnell, Why the Rule of Law Matters, 15J. DEMOCRACY 32
(2004).
59. See, e.g., M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND INSTI-
TUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA (2004).
60. Except as the sum of Latin American state law (and/or the inter-American
human rights system and isolated harmonization attempts). See generally OQUENDO, supra
note 10.
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occasional regional commission to draft model laws and USAID
assisted efforts. 61 Notably, individual Latin Americans often gener-
alize their own country's particularities on the region as a whole or
adopt the general conventions of the prevailing legal transnational-
ism, as discussed here, as a mode of engaging in this "regional"
discursive key.62
2. Legal Formalism
The fixed belief that the legal culture of the whole region can be
explained easily by the influence of one (or a couple of) promi-
nent European jurists is another example of an idefixe.63 Probably
the most salient example in modern times is the larger-than-life
place accorded to Austrian legal scholar Hans Kelsen. "The great-
est influence of Latin-American theory of law is presently being
exercised by Hans Kelsen. '"64 The influence of this archetypal fig-
ure, it has been argued, can account for the whole of legal con-
sciousness in the region. "The importance of the influence of
Kelsen is often strongly stated and the conviction voiced that Kel-
sen is thejurist of the contemporary epoch."65 Specifically, Kelsen
is credited with a very structured legal formalism, not unlike the
historical nemesis of legal realism taught to U.S. law students. 66 He
is associated with a strict formal and independent legal logic-as
opposed to more flexible policy considerations-in which law and
legal operators fit within a lock step hierarchy of written norms.67
This belief in a simple epistemology or legal consciousness-said
to characterize the region-undergirds much contemporary
61. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 32, at 625-26, 642-43 (in the case cited by Langer, the
intervention from the periphery depended on USAID support).
62. See, e.g., id.; Liliana Obreg6n, The Colluding Worlds of the Lawyer, the Scholar and the
Policymaker: A View of International Law From Latin America, 23 Wis. INT'L L.J. 145 (2005);
Arnulf Becker Lorca, International Law in Latin America or Latin American International Law?
Rise, Fall, and Retrieval of a Tradition of Legal Thinking and Political Imagination, 47 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 283 (2006);Jorge L. Esquirol, Alejandro Alvarez's Latin American Law: A Question of
Identity, 19 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 931 (2006).
63. Contrast Esquirol, Fictions, supra note 23 (examining other mid-century currents of
legal thought).
64. Josef L. Kunz, Latin-American Philosophy of Law in the Twentieth Century (Continued),
24 N.Y.U. L. REv. 473, 488 (1949) (emphasis in original).
65. Id.
66. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9-31 (1992).
67. Compare Antonio Carlos Wolkmer, INTRODUCAO AO PENSAMENTOJURiDICO CRITICO:
0 PROBLEMA DA IDEOLOGIA NA TEORIA PURA Do DIRETO 163-70 (2002); Luis VILLAR BORDA,
KELSEN EN COLOMBIA EDITORIAL TEMIS (1991) (describing Kelsen as rather a response to
critiques of classical legal thought).
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U.S.-Latin American transnationalism and produces an impover-
ished representation of the state of legal theory, diversity of
approaches, and activity ofjurists in the region. 6 The image is one
of a legal culture stuck in an earlier era of knowledge and skill
about the law. Indeed, it is quite unjustified to believe that the
whole of the region's legal consciousness can be contained in the
thought of a single theorist-no matter how postmodern one's
approach. 69 Furthermore, as discussed in more detail below, even
one individual can be interpreted and come to stand for quite dif-
ferent propositions. These may be marshaled with very different
valences than normally associated in their home contexts.
3. Failed Law
In yet another example of an idjefixe, law in Latin America suf-
fers from the permanent stigma of its practical ineffectiveness. 70
"It is practically a truism to point out that both the new constitu-
tions and the new codes [in Latin America] were ill-suited to the
countries which adapted them and that the 'grafts,' hence, failed
to 'take.' 71
In Professor McAllister's work on environmental law enforce-
ment in Brazil, we similarly encounter this constant within the
field. 72 We also have the benefit of her particular treatment of
these ideas. Professor McAllister's story, quite differently, is one of
success-"Brazil stands out as a country where legal institutions
have forged a path towards environmental rule of law"7 3-and this
is hard to reconcile with the established wisdom of the field. She
notes as much, stating, "[t]his book tells an atypical story." 74 Her
book is an empirical analysis of environmental law enforcement
efforts at both the state and federal levels in two Brazilian states,
Sio Paulo and Par. She generally lauds the broad enforcement
powers granted to public prosecutors by the 1988 constitution, and
she distinguishes among levels of success in different offices.
Professor McAllister's treatment presents one respectable
approach to the disciplinary constraints noted here. She recog-
68. See generally LOPEZ-MEDINA, supra note 11.
69. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, XV (2006)
(distinguishing between an era's legal consciousness and legal theories falling in line).
70. See Esquirol, Failed Law, supra note 31, at 80.
71. Howard J. Wiarda, Law and Political Development in Latin America: Toward a Frame-
work for Analysis, 19 Am.J. COMP. L. 434, 442 (1971).
72. McALLiSTER, supra note 1, at 12.
73. Id. at xiii.
74. Id. at 2.
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nizes the field's idjes fixes, demonstrating her familiarity with the
literature, restates them, and then works around them since they
are not really supported by her own analysis. This is not to say the
idjesfixes are frontally refuted, although Professor McAllister comes
close. "In Brazil," she states, "bringing environmental law into the
ambit of procuracies and courts has strengthened its implementa-
tion because legal institutions have strong reputations for integrity,
political independence, and public responsiveness and because
they have specialized developed knowledge and case management
tools that are conducive to resolving environmental problems. '75
However, in an effort to maintain disciplinary credibility, com-
mentators are often compelled to accommodate what everyone
already knows, or thinks they know, about the operation of law in
Latin America. When these conflict with one's own work, however,
then the question becomes what to do with these idges fixes. Nota-
bly, in Professor McAllister's work, the persistence of the idefixe of
failure resurfaces through the distinction she draws between legal
actors and regulatory agencies in Brazil. 76 The trope is retained
but redirected to the regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies have
failed at environmental protection. By contrast, the legal actors
(Professor McAllister's usage)-public prosecutors-have mostly
succeeded.77 Of course, the underlying expectation is that regula-
tory agencies-and not the public ministry-should provide mus-
cular environmental enforcement, although Professor McAllister
recognizes environmental agencies are weak the world over. 78
Indeed, it is not particularly fitting to intone the narrative of failure
here. Simply, this institutional configuration, according to Profes-
sor McAllister herself, happens to be better for (certain) environ-
mental interests in Brazil, whereas regulatory agencies may be
better somewhere else. 79 A nod to failure, though, makes the story
conform to the idgesfixes of the field. It makes it seem more famil-
75. Id. at 13.
76. See id. at 4.
77. Id. at xi.
78. Id. at 21. ("The weakness of environmental agencies is, of course, not unique to
Brazil. . .This chapter re-affirms the conventional wisdom that, despite the strength of
Brazilian environmental laws, environmental agencies are constrained in their capacities to
implement and enforce them.").
79. Compare Cristina Schwansee Romano, Land and Resource Management: Brazilian Gov-
ernment Policies Towards the Amazon Rain Forest: From a Developmental Ideology to an Environmen-
tal Consciousness? 10 COLO. J. Ir,-r'L ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 65 (1999) (describing competing
development interests balanced by environmental agency and ultimately their lack of
enforcement resources).
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iar, more consonant a story about Latin America and Brazil in
particular.
Indeed, much scholarship on Latin America takes the form of
simply repeating or retreading accepted idees. These ides may be
garbed in different theoretical clothes. Contexts, problems, and
situations may change, but the conceptual framework and ultimate
conclusions often simply default back to the same. Professor McAl-
lister's particular way around the field's accepted truths is a nota-
ble aspect of her book. This is not to say that the pall of accepted
notions does not affect the overall analysis and impact of her work.
It is indeed these background understandings that make one of
her conclusions appear startling due to its simplicity. She explains,
"[t] his book contends that the involvement of legal actors may pro-
vide an answer to the rule of law problem of environmental law in
developing countries."80 In fact, the point appears too simplistic if
it were taken solely to mean that the problem of nonenforcement
in Brazil is that legal actors are not involved (except for the suc-
cessful case of public prosecutors in environmental enforcement).
But absent the disciplinary baggage, this conclusion-that
directing more state resources and power to prosecutors increases
enforcement-undoubtedly just makes good sense.
4. Lack of Independence
Also common to the field is the explanatory power Professor
McAllister assigns the concept of legal independence. Much trans-
national analysis identifies lack of independence as a failing con-
stant of law in Latin America.8t One recent article notes the
following:
Many well-known studies of judicial independence in Latin
America make what might be called monolithic and millenarian
arguments. Keith Rosenn, for example, argues that all of Latin
America suffers from a fairly permanent lack of judicial
independence ....
Given the proliferation of definitions of independence
used by the various scholars, if there is any surprise in the litera-
ture it is that everyone agrees that, whatever independence
might be, Latin America does not have it.82
80. MCALLISTER, supra note 1, at 13 (citations omitted).
81. See Esquirol, Failed Law, supra note 31, at 78; see also Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection
of Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19 U. MiAMi INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 3-13, 32 (1987).
82. Daniel Brinks, Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina: The Begin-
ning of a New Millennium?, 40 TEX. INT'L LJ. 595, 595-96 (2005).
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Of course, judges beholden to outside interests and forces would
subvert the meaning of an "independent judiciary" in a liberal
democracy. Independence, however, can have a host of different
meanings. 83 It may mean, in any one case, independence from
other branches of government, from partisan politics, from the
interests of litigants, or from any outside influence other than the
law. 84 In the Latin American context, in particular, one or more of
these versions can always be picked as lacking.85 In effect, the con-
sensus, as the commentator above has noted, is its permanent
failure.
In any case, independence appears to be relatively straightfor-
ward in only two senses. First, as simply formal independence, it
can mean a completely autonomous organizational structure with
lockstep benchmarks for tenure and promotion of its members. In
this way, for example, judicial decisions will be-at least as a formal
matter-free of illegitimate influence at the level of judicial
appointments and promotion. Second, independence also
appears relatively clear in extraordinary and unlikely cases of com-
plete institutional freedom. Where an institution is not subject to
any checks or controls, its independence is definitional even if
other values may be compromised.
The difficult cases, however, are all those where institutional
independence is held to the countervailing requirement of
accountability. And yet, scholars presume to be able to recognize
the right mix and easily quantify it. Indeed, a common measure
cited as proof of judicial independence is the percentage of court
cases decided against the state, where the latter is a party.86 A high
percentage is purported to show political autonomy. However, in
actuality, it can just as well represent a high incidence of judicial
excess.8 7 Distinguishing between political autonomy and judicial
83. See Owen Fiss, The Limits ofJudicial Independence, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 57,
57-60 (1993-94).
84. See generally GERMAN BURGOS SILVA, INDEPENDENCIA JUDICIAL EN AM9RICA LATINA
iDE QUIPN? EPARA QUA? iC6mO? 13-42 (2003).
85. See Esquirol, Failed Law, supra note 31, at 78.
86. See, e.g., Joel G. Verner, The Independence of Supreme Courts in Latin America: A Review
of the Literature, 16 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 463 (1984); David Clark, Judicial Protection of the
Constitution in Latin America, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 405, 433, 435, 438 (1975) (finding in
favor of relatively effective judicial review correlated to economic development).
87. See UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?, supra note 14, at 74-78; see,
e.g., PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW
YORK 139 (1990) ("determining the Court's direction involves more than a count of the
decisions. By emphasizing results over reasoning, these studies [showing more statutes
were upheld than over-ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court] tend to have misinterpreted it.").
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activism is more complicated to ascertain and difficult to discern
than simply counting cases decided against the state.88 Addition-
ally, judicial intervention in the area of public law tells us little
about levels of neutrality and objectivity in private law matters.89 A
more nuanced, qualitative analysis depends on the meaning of
independence espoused. If the meaning is freedom from all
outside influences, then certainly clear evidence of independence
is rather unlikely as its assertion rests on a highly controversial the-
ory about law's singular autonomy from politics and society. It can
certainly be argued, at least with respect to such idealized version
of law, that legal independence is simply not attainable operation-
ally.90 Thus, the question of legal independence is more problem-
atic than merely recognizing that it comes in degrees, as Professor
McAllister states.
Independence, as an aspirational ideal, projects the achievement
of faithfulness-not to ideology, politics, or oneself, but to strict
enactment of "the rule of law." In other words, decisions and
actions, so this theory goes, should strive to conform solely to the
law. Here, too, there is a potential multiplicity of outcomes-all in
good faith. These outcomes derive from alternate interpretations
of the law, conflicting jurisdictions and norms, and the relative
unachievability of neutral and objective decision making. Singular-
ity of outcomes-under this meaning of independence-is prima-
rily a produced effect and not any one practice. Certainly, the
imagined possibility and repeated assertions of "independence," in
specific contexts, reinforce a sense of law-ness: i.e., as the opposite
of ideological, political, or personally idiosyncratic law. As such,
exercising discretion in legal matters in such a way as to generate
general acceptance as objective and independent is, under our cur-
rent state of legal technology, rather more a complex performance
than a particular practice. Regardless, in a wide array of situations,
legal officials must inevitably act within zones of more or less dis-
cretion and decide among multiple and conflicting positions. Yet
despite this well-known understanding of legal independence as
88. Brinks, supra note 82, at 606 (attempting to strike the right mix: "In summary,
then, a strong independent and diverse oversight body will ensure that decisions are made
according to accepted standards for judicial decision making." This, however, merely dis-
places the problem of independence on to the oversight body, which must itself be inde-
pendent, and it assumes there are clear "accepted standards for judicial decision
making.").
89. KENNEDY, supra note 69, at 4.
90. See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE L.J. 1, 10, 29 (1984).
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relational and practically unattainable in any sure way, its func-
tional unachievement in Latin America is a standard diagnosis of
the specific failings of law in the region.9' A lack of independence
is thus always relatively easy to claim. It would not be difficult, for
those so disposed, to consider any particular legal action as tainted
by considerations or influences outside a narrow definition of law.
Professor McAllister's analysis is likewise drawn to the question
of independence, not of the judiciary but of prosecutors. 92 The
evidence she marshals in this regard-not unlike past studies of
Latin American judiciaries-is the number of cases investigated,
filed, or settled.93 For Professor McAllister, high numbers signal
energetic enforcement, and, conversely, low numbers signal
outside constraint.94 Under this test, the Sdo Paulo state and fed-
eral prosecutors and Pardi federal prosecutors are independent,
but the Pardi state prosecutors are not.95 Of course, these numbers
can have alternative explanations and lead to different conclu-
sions: for example, high numbers could signal high activity lacking
in priorities, coordination, or accountability. Professor McAllister
herself considers this possibility about the Sio Paulo state prosecu-
tors, who reported high numbers.96 Nevertheless, she concludes
instead that the lower reported activity of Pard state prosecutors
indicates their lack of independence. It may very well be that, at
the end of the day, the Pardi state prosecutors should have more
discretion from a certain perspective, and the Sdo Paulo ones
should retain the same (or less) from some other or the same per-
spective. Yet the concept of independence or lack thereof, though
a long-standing idge fixe about law in Latin America, is not suffi-
ciently helpful as an analytical category here. In fact, it is actually
somewhat deceptive.
The multiple meanings of this concept, moreover, are evident in
its variety of uses within Professor McAllister's own conclusions.
Some examples are as follows. "While not directly stated and dis-
cussed by Valente or other early commentators, the most funda-
mental factor constraining the state Minist~rio Pdblico of Pardi is its
91. See generally Esquirol, Failed Law, supra note 31.
92. See McALLISTER, supra note 1, at 108-20.
93. Id. at 96-108.
94. Id. at 86-87.
95. Id. at 87.
96. See, e.g., id. at 115 (too much autonomy of the Sdo Paulo prosecutor leads to too
much control or accountability [information requests] of the Sao Paulo environmental
agency limiting its effectiveness and ad hoc re-arranging its priorities).
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lack of independence from the executive branch." 97 Professor
McAllister criticizes, in effect, the 1988 Brazilian Constitution for
not going far enough in granting the Minist~rio Piiblico greater
autonomy. Proposals in favor of internal appointments of attor-
neys general and complete control over their own budgets were
advanced by an organization of Brazilian prosecutors at the time. 98
They were rejected, however, by the constitutional assembly, pro-
viding instead that state governors appoint attorneys general from
a three-person slate provided by the respective public ministries
and that the executive exercise budgetary controls.99 Notably
though, "comparing the Brazilian Minist6rio Piblico with the
Minist~rio Pfiblico in nine other countries, Kerche finds that on
the spectrum of independence from political control, the Minis-
t6rio Pfiblico is the extreme case of independence. '"100
In a different sense of the meaning of independence, Professor
McAllister maintains that "[d]espite the constitutional provisions
that favor the political independence of the Minist~io Pfiblico,
Pardi governors managed to retain influence over the work of the
state prosecutors through their control of the state budget process
and their power to appoint the attorney general." 10 1 Professor
McAllister's position is based on interviews of Brazilian prosecutors
for this study, without much critical distance on the situations giv-
ing rise to such beliefs. However, as already noted, these condi-
tions are not unique to the state of Par. The same structural and
functional features apply to state prosecutors in all Brazilian
states.102 Therefore, at a minimum, the question of discretion
must be understood in relation to particular cases of undue influ-
ence or in some other more disaggregated way.
In yet a different usage, Professor McAllister finds that "Pard's
state prosecutors may also lack independence from city govern-
ment officials in the localities where they work."103 In this case, the
term "lack of independence" has a different sense. It refers to the
fact that, due to insufficient resources, Pard state prosecutors de
facto rely on municipal resources, in indirect ways, in order to carry
out their work. The implication is that, as a result, prosecutors are
likely to be swayed by these accidental local patrons.
97. Id. at 110.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 65.
101. Id. at 110.
102. Id. at 108-09.
103. Id. at 111.
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These various statements reflect the multiple tasks performed by
the concept of independence. Certainly, at its most basic level,
independence can be either positive or negative in a particular sit-
uation. Indeed, it may introduce welcome freedom from
unwanted political interference, or it may usher in unbridled arbi-
trariness, political bias, or personal idiosyncrasy.10 4 Thus, indepen-
dence is not an absolute good. It is constantly in relation to other
considerations. Moreover, dependence may be a positive value when
used to mean accountability. It may also be positive when referring
to external influences infusing the law with corresponding societal
priorities, synchronized governmental policy, or simply good man-
agement. Professor McAllister appears to sense as much-"it
[independence] is a matter of degree"-although she does not dis-
entangle the various meanings and possibly conflicting objectives
signified by this concept. 105
Indeed, by resting her conclusion on "lack of independence,"
Professor McAllister forecloses a number of other promising lines
of inquiry. Her conclusion preempts a number of other questions
alluded to but not explored in the text.10 6 For example, how can
the individual autonomy of prosecutors be reconciled with coun-
tervailing concerns such as individual civil liberties; prosecutorial
accountability; office and individual case coordination; desirable
levels of discretion in specialized agencies; proper priorities of reg-
ulatory agencies faced with legal sanctions for noncompliance with
prosecutorial demands; and the balance of prosecutorial time
spent on environmental versus other matters of social and collec-
tive concern?10 7 Additionally, the goal of more independence may
have different meanings for the prosecutors interviewed, poten-
tially manifesting their frustration-possibly tactically-against
incomplete autonomy, insufficient resources, individual reactions
to particular cases, an antagonistic superior, and the like. Relat-
edly, how does "lack of independence" clarify the differences
104. See generally Brinks, supra note 82.
105. See MCALLISTER, supra note 1, at 115.
106. As an example, she herself notes that a principal difference between Par-A state
prosecutors and the others examined is the relative lack of support received from the state
environmental agency. Id. at 105 and 30, 37.
107. See generally Rosangela Batista Calvancanti, The Effectiveness of Law, in ENFORCING
THE RuLE OF LAW: SOCIAL AcCOUNTABILITY IN THE NEW LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES 34
(E. Peruzzotti & C. Smulovitz eds., 2006) (noting competing claims upon Ministhrio Pb-
lico resources from different societal interests, the general limitation of administrative dis-
cretion in favor of Ministhrio Ptiblico "strict legal enforcement" actions, and potential over-
reliance on Ministerio Ptdblico by civil society groups possibly leading to their
demobilization).
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between Sio Paulo state and Pardi state where both offices operate
under the same structural framework? If the difference is a matter
of perception, as suggested in the text, then what contributes to
that perception and how does this book-arguing actual lack of
independence-contribute to that construction?
In sum, idges fixes are often interjected as default diagnoses or
generic conclusions when the actual complexities are hard to
resolve, or when political conflicts are not easily reconcilable. It is
a common place to end. Some form of external dependence-cast
negatively-is highlighted in order to confirm the general theme.
While the charge of undue influence may be justified in particular
cases, if the level of independence imagined is law's complete
autonomy or some composite mix of different meanings of inde-
pendence, then Latin America's legal institutions must assuredly
always fail the test. In any case, the congealment of certain idges
fixes-such as this one-limits broader analysis and options for
reform.
B. Anthropologizing the Law
The unrelenting background notion that Latin American laws
and legal structures present only part-and a small part at that-of
the picture of legality in these countries is also difficult to demys-
tify. There is a well-developed literature on the region that social
norms-variously characterized as informal law, law in action, soci-
ety, and legal pluralism-are as important as, if not more impor-
tant than, state law.108  Professor McAllister summarizes the
conventional wisdom in the following way:
Studies of Brazilian legal culture reveal the extent to which the
cultural dimension of the rule of law has been lacking.
Brazilians often quip that some law simply "stay on paper" ("ficar
no papel') and "that are laws that catch on, and other that don't"
("hd lei que pega, e lei que ndo pega'). Moreover, Brazil is the land
of the "jeito," by which those political and social connections
have ways to get around or "bend the law." The jeito, which
includes not only conventional corruption but also situations
where a public servant deviates from the law because it is unreal-
istic or unjust, has been the norm rather than the exception in
many areas of law. A 1996 survey of law students in the Brazilian
state of Rio de Janeiro revealed that only 6% believed that con-
flicts in Brazil were principally resolved through the law and
legal institutions; 94% considered the jeito or the "law of the
strongest" to be predominant. In a Brazilian public opinion sur-
108. See, e.g., Professor McAllister's citations to this body of literature. MCALLSTER,
supra note 1, at 10-13.
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vey, 82% agreed that Brazilians disobey most laws and 80%
agreed that only the poor have to obey the law. The application
of law in Brazil is perceived as highly socially contingent.109
While some version of this account is applicable everywhere, in
Latin America it has been endowed with a particular salience. 110
Its effect, ultimately, is that mainstream national legal discourse-
from a transnational perspective-is significantly downgraded.
Such discursive practices are presumed limited to a small sector of
society-the Europeanized elite.' And even within the Europe-
anized elite, they are often seen as mostly symbolic.
This schematization of legal systems in the region has the effect
of anthropologizing the field of law. Anthropologizing law, as used
here, is different than simply contextualizing the law or linking law
to society and social interests. 1 2 Rather, it advances the idea that
state law is practically irrelevant and that normative choices are
made primarily by the people through other, informal, and social
means. This overall direction suggests that sociological or anthro-
pological methods are better suited than legal analysis."13  The
stress on informal law or divergent social practices calls for analysis
not unlike that applied to primitive cultures or native populations
studied for their particular cosmologies."14 In a similar way, Latin
America's state law appears not amenable to the same type of legal
reasoning and legal-political debates as in the United States or
Europe. It is perceived as predominantly a mix of exclusive elite
politics and passive symbolic representations.1 5 Thus, law is seen
as more the province of the social sciences than legal debate. One
commentator has described it as follows:
109. Id. at 12 (citations omitted).
110. See Professor McAllister's own observation that "Canadian regulators lowered
their expectations and bent the rules when confronted with noncompliant pulp mills. Sim-
ilarly, Gunningham (1987) found that the lack of prosecution in the regulation of Austra-
lian asbestos mines led to "negotiated non-compliance" with ultimately fatal results." Id. at
15.
111. See generally Esquirol, Fictions, supra note 23.
112. See Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1017, 1022
(1981) (on the difference between contextualizing and anthropologizing).
113. No reference to any particular anthropological methodology is intended. Still the
distinction between anthropology and sociology drawn by Claude-Levi Strauss serves suffi-
ciently well. CLAuDE Ltvi-STRAuss, STRUcTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 2-3 (1963).
114. See generally Walter Mignolo, Human Understanding and (Latin) American Interests:
The Polltics and Sensibilities of Geohistorical Locations, in A COMPANION TO POSTCOLONIAL STUD-
IES 180 (H. Schwarz & S. Ray eds., 2004).
115. See, e.g., YvEs DEZELAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE
WARS 33 (2007); MAuRicio GARciA VILLEGAS, LA EFICACIA SIMB6LICA DEL DERECHO: EXAMEN
DE SITUACIONES COLOMBIANAS (1994).
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[T]he best available American legal scholarship on Latin Ameri-
can legal institutions has been weighted toward what a Latin
American lawyer would label as empirical studies rather than a
straightjuridical (i.e., technical and conceptual) analysis of legal
norms. The viewpoint of Anglo-American legal scholars on
Latin American legal problems generally does not make much
sense to the typical Latin American jurist.t 16
This anthropologizing tendency presents a certain picture of law
and legal institutions as a record of political decisions made else-
where and, alternately, a catalogue of political demands that
remain unmet.117 In either case, each picture merely records-in
an unmediated way-the individual and societal bargains struck
separately in the body politic. As such, they register the resulting
arrangements, but are not believed as significantly acting upon or
determining outcomes in concrete struggles-except possibly in
some inappropriate way. This persistent perception significantly
discredits participation in local legal modes of engagement.
The "law on the books" and, consequently, debates about such
law seem like a shallow or ritualistic exercise, indeed. The inter-
play of legal arguments and positions taken by legal actors, in the
wake of this critique, appear all largely disingenuous.", As such,
transnational analysis quickly jumps to party politics, clientelistic
networks, and personal influence and corruption as explanations
for legal decision making. 119 Without such standard references
and hedges included, representations of law for transnational audi-
ences appear woefully incomplete, seemingly unaccompanied by
an account of the real "law in action." Indeed, this perspective
adopts a deeply critical view of law as just pure politics or corrup-
tion, in Latin America. These accounts have the effect of suggesting
that formal law is thus largely irrelevant-or pretextual-in the
face of predominantly extralegal practices.
The relationship between law and social practices-and their
purportedly exceptional divide in Latin America-is not really my
focus here. 120 More pertinent for my purposes are the particulari-
ties of the transnational legal field within legal discourse in the
region. As a significant source of knowledge production, the for-
mer widely shapes the attitudes and perspectives of jurists, law stu-
116. Garro, supra note 26, at 601.
117. See generally VILLEGAS, supra note 115.
118. See, e.g., id.
119. See generally JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 19;
THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 19.
120. See generally Esquirol, Continuing Fictions, supra note 35.
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dents, and public opinion.121 Moreover, due to its global politics,
transnational legal analysis forms the basis for internationally sup-
ported law reform. Considered this way, this field can-on a spec-
trum-either more horizontally engage a range of local actors and
their projects or more limitedly engage only other similarly
inflected transnational interventions. Certainly, as noted above, all
forms of legal writing-from the more traditional doctrine to trans-
national legal discourse, project evaluations, and empirical work,
such as Professor McAllister's book-contribute to the operation
of legal institutions. The current limitations of the transnational
genre, however, narrow the field of debate and privilege positions
fitting conventional forms.
C. False Cognates
For the transnational observer-participant, engaging other legal
systems is subject to a number of pitfalls. There are those pitfalls
specific to Latin America listed above. But there are others com-
mon to all comparative work. For example, Merryman has noted
that "[m]uch of the Italian doctrine may seem strange and unreal
to the American observer.., it is easy, too easy, to criticize Italian
legal thought. By emphasizing its extremes and ignoring its con-
text one can make it appear ridiculous."122 Some examples are
contained in the following sections.
The notion of "false cognates," for instance, describes the sur-
face similarity of certain common terms and references that may
actually signify something different. As used here, it refers to the
specificity of legal discourse in any one place. References consist
of authorities, sources, and positions marshaled in quite contextual
ways. From an outside perspective, such legal arguments may seem
anachronistically formalist, oddly imitative of European jurists, sty-
listically obfuscating, theoretically unsophisticated, or simply
unrecognizable in a myriad of ways. Thus, it would be quite diffi-
cult to engage in such legal politics in any earnest, participatory
manner. The transnational participant-observer, therefore, would
likely not take positions in the same stylistic and conventional man-
ner as jurists operating in that genre.
False cognates, in the way described here, highlight the varying
meanings of legal theories or legal authorities in particular con-
121. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-
2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMic DEVELOPMENT: A CuancAL APPRASAL 19 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
122. Merryman, supra note 5, at 63.
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texts. Specific ideas and individual scholars may come to stand for
different propositions and political valences in different places. In
this way, for example, Ronald Dworkin or Hans Kelsen-men-
tioned earlier-could play quite different roles and represent quite
different political constituencies across a variety of arenas. 123 The
quite accepted view of Kelsen, in Latin America, as the chief-if
not lone-architect of the region's modern positivism has already
been noted. This view may be contrasted with a view of Kelsen as
the inspiration for post-WWII constitutional courts in Europe and
advocate of constitutional review powers by a high court.124 It is
also different from Kelsen as a pragmatist in the international law
context, explicitly skeptical of outward forms and empty philoso-
phizing. 125 Alternately, Kelsen can be viewed as a defender of the
objectivity and neutrality of liberal legality in the wake of more rad-
ical critiques of the law's interpretative indeterminacy, while still
accepting some of the insights of those critiques. 126
In a different example, Dworkin is typically understood in the
United States as a rather mainstream supporter of generic liberal
legalism. 127 While he acknowledges the multiplicity of legal materi-
als suggesting their apparent plasticity, he also provides a comfort-
ing response against more radical critics.' 28 Indeed, Dworkin
provides a way of reconciling the competing tensions, objectives,
and policies underlying the common law and legal interpretation
more generally. Under a broader structural umbrella, he provides
an amount of certainty and nonpoliticalness, ultimately, to the sys-
tem of law.' 29 In this way, Dworkin is understood as a response to
legal realism and even to critical legal studies on the indeterminacy
of law and its camouflaged politics.
By contrast, in the past decade, Dworkin has been embraced as a
more radical champion in certain Latin American countries. In
Colombia, for example, defenders of the expansive jurisprudence
123. Compare BORDA, supra note 67; David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar
Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 7 (1994) (painting different portraits of Kelsen).
124. Bojan Bugaric, Courts as Policy-Makers: Lessons from Transition, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J.
247, 256-57 (2001).
125. Kennedy, supra note 123, at 22 ("It turns out that Kelsen is adept at many of the
criticisms to which we have learned to think him easily subject.").
126. See BORDA, supra note 67, at 43 (noting that Kelsen's theory recognizes judicial
law-making, in this way rejecting legal exegesis).
127. See Ronald Dworkin, in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 551, 554 (David
Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006).
128. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
129. See generally Ronald Dworkin, supra note 127, at 551-57.
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of the Colombian Constitutional Court have embraced his theories
as ajustification for the court's opinions. 130 Indeed, Dworkin pro-
vides the bases for a widely contextual and responsive judicial deci-
sion making. This, no doubt, goes beyond his self-stated
reassurances of judicial constraint as a function of legal precedents
and principles associated with the common law. Dworkin's empha-
sis on judicial practice and the Herculean task of judges in recon-
ciling often-competing legal authorities from his perspective within
the common-law tradition, however, make him particularly appeal-
ing to actors interested in defending the more daring and contro-
versial decisions of Colombia's high court.13 Moreover, in Brazil,
for example, Dworkin is seen by some as too radical. 132 One com-
mentator rejects Dworkin, associating him with the Brazilian
Supreme Court's excessive discretion.133 The Brazilian Supreme
Court, in a Marbury-like fashion, has assumed the power of consti-
tutional review over amendments to the constitution, thus making
itself the final word on any political change short of revolution.
134
These more recent judicial practices in Latin America are con-
troversial in their own particular ways. Commonly, civilian judges
are projected as mere "mouthpieces of the law."135 Certainly, in
the constitutional realm, these constraints are somewhat loosened.
The danger, however, is that these constitutional opinions may be
deemed thoroughly political and thus not law at all. Additionally,
many of these decisions, in the Colombian context, for example,
were handed down in the context of tutela proceedings. Tutela pro-
ceedings are individual rights of action claiming a constitutional
130. DIEGO LOPEZ-MEDINA, EL DERECHO DE Los JUECES: OBLIGATORIEDAD DEL
PRECEDENTE CONSTITUCIONAL, ANALISIS DE SENTENCIAS Y LfNEASJURISPRUDENCIALES Y TEORfA
DEL DERECHOJUDICIAL 194 (2000).
131. Id.
132. See Conrado Hyabner Mendes, Constitutions and Institutions: justice, Identity and
Reform: Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in the Brazilian Supreme Court, 17 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 449 (2005).
133. See id. at 457-60 (preferring Jeremy Waldron over Ronald Dworkin in arguing
against the Brazilian Supreme Court's power of constitutional review over constitutional
amendments).
134. Supremo Tribunal Federal, A4;do Direta de Inconstitucionalidade, S.T.F., ADI No.
926-3/1993 (Brazil), Relator: Ministro Sydney Sanches, http://www.sff.gov.br/portal/pet-
icaolnicial/pesquisarPeticaolnicial.asp; Supremo Tribunal Federal, Agdo Direta de Incon-
stitucionalidade, S.T.F., ADI No. 466-2/1991 (Brazil), Relator: Ministro Celso de Mello,
http://www.stf.gov.br/portal/peticaolnicial/pesquisarPeticaolnicial (holding that consti-
tutional amendments "that are not original juridical norms - are not excluded, for that
very reason, from the ambit of successive and repressive constitucional control."); see also
Miyuki Sato, Judicial Review in Brazil. Nominal and Real, 3 GLOBAL JURiST ADVANCES art. 4, 1
(2003).
135. See MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 5, at 56.
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wrong.' 36 The Court's decisions have no erga omnes effects and are
not binding precedent. 137 Dworkin, more precisely, provides a way
of reconciling the potential multiplicity of judicial outcomes while
at the same time ensuring the legal nature of the final decision. 38
Thus, he and his work have been mobilized by legal actors in
Colombia to serve as patron authority for the institutionality and
legality of the court. This often extends to defending the most
controversial and political-seeming decisions. From a conservative
perspective within these legal battles, both Dworkin in Colombia
and Dworkin in Brazil thus seem pretty radical.
The fact that ideas and their proponents may be marshaled quite
differently in other discursive fields is not very surprising. National
law is typically structured in rather particular ways. Like anywhere
else, it is shaped by the projects and politics and the critiques and
alternative projects championed within the field over time. This is
equally the case in the context of Latin America. As such, legal
discourse in Latin American countries has its own specificities. A
useful comparison is the way in which legal transplants are com-
monly described to take different forms in their new environments.
Similarly, legal ideas and their authors may take different forms
and political valences in local legal debates.' 39
In the United States, for example, the U.S. tradition is believed
to be quite distinctive as a result of legal realist critiques and coun-
tervailing responses and defenses by supporters of liberal legal-
ism. 140 The civilian tradition, by contrast, is widely understood as
anchored in the school of exegesis, with its particularly narrow style
of judicial opinion and the always defensive posture of promoters
of more outwardly contextual and policy-oriented judicial decision
making. 141 As a result of these and other landmark influences, cer-
tain legal positions and authorities can be read quite differently
across fields. Thus, in the Dworkin example, he passes from
defender of legal liberalism in the United States-against the
assault of legal realism and critical legal studies-to the challenger
136. See generally Eduardo Cifuentes Mufloz, La Acci6n de Tutela en Colombia, 3 lus ET
PRAXis 165 (1997); NtSTOR IVAN OSUNA PATI$JO, TUTELA Y AMPARO: DERECHOS PROTEGIDOS
(1998).
137. See generally Mufioz, supra note 136.
138. See Ronald Dworkin, supra note 127, at 554, 556.
139. See generally Esquirol, Continuing Fictions, supra note 35.
140. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997).
141. See Mitchell Lasser, "Lit. Theory" Put to the Test: A Comparative Literary Analysis of
American Judicial Tests and French Judicial Discourse, 111 HARv. L. REV. 690, 697 (1998).
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of legal exegesis and champion of legal realism in Colombia and
Brazil.
Although quite explainable, these differences can be misleading.
Particularly in the context of transnational scholarship, not under-
standing these shifts reduces the possibility of horizontal engage-
ment with participants in local discursive fields. First, many local
interlocutors may be seen simply to have misunderstood the trans-
national authorities or positions they are marshaling. 142 This
apparent misunderstanding produces a distancing effect. A trans-
national commentator may feel compelled either to correct the
misunderstanding or to describe the debate in sociological terms.
In the former case, intervention may take the form of explaining
the real Dworkin, Kelsen, or some other authority. Shorn of the
local context, this type of transnational intervention, however, may
have little impact. Also, it could lead to the opposite of intended
effects. The latter situation is exemplified by the results, surprising
Law and Development scholars in the 1970s, in which defending
legal realism merely strengthened the legal instrumentalism of
authoritarian governments. 143 Understandably, the most commit-
ted progressives in the movement pulled away from these efforts. 144
Alternatively, if not correcting the misunderstanding, a transna-
tional commentator may be prone to note the curious use of the
authorities and attempt only to describe the ways in which they are
used-i.e., to map them. Indeed, scholars associated with both the
New Approaches to International Law and the Latcrit South-North
project-on different but parallel tracks-have been actively
engaged in such projects.' 45 Participants have sought to connect
with critical streams of scholarship in the global South. As a first
step, they have sought to map the lines of legal-political debate in
the region. While this exercise surely provides a better understand-
ing of the legal actors and their intellectual tools, it still does not
bridge the gap of dialogic engagement and horizontal participa-
142. See generally L6PEZ-MEDINA, supra note 11 (explaining his theory of misreadings in
contexts of reception).
143. See generally GARDNER, supra note 48. A clear example of this is the 1960's-70's
generation of Law and Development in which legal realism, pragmatism, and social engi-
neering were promoted by legal assistance programs which were read as no more than
instrumentalism and ad hockery, the persistent foes of liberal legalism within the civilian
tradition.
144. David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1062, 1063-64
(1974).
145. See David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International Law: A Bibliog-
raphy, 35 Hxv. INr'L LJ. 417, 417-18 (1994).
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tion. In fact, this route parallels some of the sections described
earlier above. A positive next step would entail a common ground
of engagement in which transnational commentators can partici-
pate more widely in legal institutions across the region.
D. Different Dialects
Another impediment to transnational engagement is that similar
legal concepts and critiques may be expressed in different ways
across legal traditions and national legal histories. This impedi-
ment is analogous to the notion of false cognates, expressed above,
but it refers instead to similar concepts garbed in different outward
forms. Thus, a casual transnational focus may not easily reveal sim-
ilar notions that inform legal practices across localities. This is the
case since effectively equivalent notions may be quite differently
expressed. Thus, the same idea in a different jurisprudential con-
text can be missed if it strays too far from the familiar. Alterna-
tively, different ideas having the same functional effect can easily
be overlooked.
In this line, some simple examples may be drawn from theories
about law's nature and legal interpretation. These topics have
been the frequent subjects of much comparative law scholarship.
Because comparisons of common law and civilian systems are the
most abundant, a number of functional jurisprudential equivalents
across these two traditions are well known. These are not, how-
ever, the only parallels. A more detailed list could be produced by
comparing particular national legal histories and jurisprudence.
Indeed, the "mapping" of alternative jurisprudential currents in
other jurisdictions, as noted above, is an important first step. Some
critical transnationalists have begun to document a wealth of lesser
known and often subordinate ideas and positions advanced by
local legal actors. 146
More specifically, the examples that follow further explain the
point. Conceptual formalism in the form of Langdellian classical
legal thought, for instance, has some striking parallels to the conti-
nental school of exegesis, the German Pandectist school, and Aus-
tinian analytical jurisprudence. 147 Legal realism has some distinct
analogues in the work of Rudolf von Jherring in Germany and the
Juristes Inquiets in France described by Marie-Claire Belleau. 148 Ros-
146. See, e.g., Obreg6n, supra note 62; Lorca, supra note 62.
147. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 140.
148. Marie-Claire Belleau, The "Juristes Inquiets" Legal Classicism and Criticism in Early
Twentieth Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 379, 390-98 (1997).
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coe Pound's sociological jurisprudence, 1960s law and society, and
law-in-context ideas, in similar fashion, greatly resemble the inter-
pretive methods of Franiois G~ny and the sociological comparativ-
ism of Rena David in France, and, more contemporarily, the legal
formants of Rodolfo Sacco in Italy.149 Granted, this is a fast and
dirty list. It leaves out much nuance and complexity in these cur-
sory references to broad jurisprudential theories and movements.
For my purposes, it is sufficient to suggest that quite similar legal
ideas appear in different jurisprudential contexts under varying
forms and monikers.
One would misperceive U.S. jurisprudence for example if, under
the impression that the common law is case-based, problem solv-
ing, and relatively uncodified, legal formalism was believed limited
to a superseded past. Alternatively, one would misunderstand
much civilian jurisprudence if, under the belief that the civil law is
code-based and exegetical, contextual and policy-oriented legal
interpretation was thought non-existent. 150 These instances of mis-
recognition lead to significant misunderstandings. They may occur
for different reasons. As noted above, the concepts may be articu-
lated differently as a result of the local epistemic context, its partic-
ular trajectory, and the specific idiosyncrasies of their proponents.
Additionally, certain notions may appear at different historical
periods and thus may seem quite unrelated. In some cases, some
notions may have gained more prominence in one jurisprudential
locale than another. For example, legal realism is widely recog-
nized as constitutive of mainstream legal consciousness in the
United States today. Yet, an analogous set of ideas articulated by
French legal scholars at the turn of the twentieth century is not
recognized as equally influential in contemporary France. 151 The
underlying ideas of French legal realists do-to some degree-
inform contemporary French and civilian legal practices, in
effect.152 The distinction, therefore, between concepts that actu-
ally inform legal practices and those that are, in addition, overtly
recognized as informing such legal practice is potentially another
reason for the differences. In any case, the fuller jurisprudential
spectrum of a particular locale may not be immediately apparent.
As such, one or only a few aspects-no doubt the most salient-
149. See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 28-34 (1991).
150. See Mitchell Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits:Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System,
104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1343-1042 (1995).
151. See Belleau, supra note 148, at 379.
152. See Lasser, supra note 141, at 694-702.
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seeming-could be mistakenly taken as a full explanation of a par-
ticular legal system as a whole. In this way, the casual transnational
legal scholar may produce a quite wooden or, stated differently,
one-dimensional representation. If this image then forms the basis
for a diagnosis of law's shortcomings, then the remedy suggested-
if one were to be proposed-would quite likely run awry.
In the Latin American context, 1960s law and development,
again, provides an example, in the form of its diagnoses of exces-
sive formalism and lack of legal realism. These explanations of the
problem with local legal systems were associated with economic
underdevelopment. 153 The importation of U.S.-style legal realism,
chiefly by way of the pragmatic, case-method, policy-oriented legal
education, was the remedy proposed. 154 This outlook, however,
ignored the already present notions of legal realism within the tra-
ditions and national jurisprudence of many Latin American coun-
tries-whether through the major civilian transnational sources or
more local jurisprudential production. 155 Specifically, German his-
toricism and French sociological jurisprudence, as has been noted
already by some commentators, provided a more familiar source
for the same objectives sought by developmentalists-and probably
better domesticated than the purely instrumental-seeming legal
realism. 156 Alternatively, additional sources within the particular
national histories and local jurisprudential debates would have
been available as well. Indeed, at the time of early law-and-develop-
ment effort, a number of regional initiatives were underway seek-
ing to transform legal education and interpretative methods. 157
Transnational legal actors missed an opportunity to engage more
significantly in debates of reform of legal education and alternative
legal interpretation methods by failing to learn the local legal
dialects.
Rather, developmentalists mistook the legal landscape in Latin
America as an imagined earlier version of U.S. legal culture. 158
The image was of late nineteenth and early twentieth century class-
153. See Esquirol, Continuing Fictions, supra note 35, at 42-43.
154. Id. at 72.
155. See generally H.B. JACOBINI, A STUDY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
SEEN IN WORKS OF LATIN AMERICAN WRITERS (1954).
156. See David Kennedy, Political Choices and Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAw
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CPrTCAL APPRAISAL 104 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos
eds., 2006).
157. See Esquirol, Continuing Fictions, supra note 35, at 69-81.
158. See generally id.; Esquirol, Failed Law, supra note 31, at 92; GARDNER, supra note 48;
Merryman, supra note 30, at 480-81; Trubek & Galanter, supra note 144, at 1079.
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ical formalism, the principal image of that period's legal conscious-
ness. And the 1960s reading of turn-of-the-century formalism-
relevant to the first generation of law and development practition-
ers-found that this mode of legal reasoning was wrong politically
and wrong as a matter of theory.159 Of course, the charge of for-
malism is not a rejection of logical reasoning or conceptual catego-
ries all together but is rather an expression of deep skepticism
about certain types of legal reasoning. Specifically, it rejects the
possibility of deriving clear answers past a certain level of abstrac-
tion in nonconflicting and noncontradictory ways. The cut-off for
suitable legal reasoning is, however, completely socially contingent.
And the post-classical-legal-thought U.S. preference is simply a
function of the subsequent socially constructed consensus on the
basis of contemporary determinants of convincing legal analysis.
This convincing or acceptable form of legal analysis can be viewed
as a performative act to which mainstream legal operators would
generally accede. It can also be viewed phenomenologically as
intellectual work within a particular paradigm of knowledge or
consciousness. 60 In any case, regardless of one's background the-
ory about the sources of "thinking like a lawyer," its particularity
and contingency cannot be denied.
The more Manichean perception of formalism versus pragma-
tism projected onto Latin America at the time, however, had the
effect of advocating against the locally constructed consensus on
what constitutes convincing legal reasoning. As such, much of the
richness of Latin American legal production was missed. Indeed,
the quite impressive jurisprudential pedigree of European and
civilian legal traditions was, for all effective purposes, ignored.
Rather, development scholars viewed such references as signs of
mere juristic elitism and transplanted cultural non sequiturs. The
jurisprudential activity of local actors was also significantly ignored,
relegated to a mind-numbing legal formalism that appeared to
explain the whole of the legal culture, and provided, presumably,
its sufficient explanation. Thus, operating on the basis of this per-
ceived one-dimensionality of an unmitigated legal formalism, the
natural remedy appeared to be U.S.-style legal realism, the histori-
cally hailed antidote to the wrong reasoning and bad results of an
anachronistic classical formalism.
159. See KENNEDY, supra note 69, at xxxv.
160. See generally Duncan Kennedy, A Left Phenomenological Critique of the Hart/Kelsen The-
ory of Legal Interpretation, in PROBLEMAS CONTEMPORANEOS DE LA FILOSOFIA DEL DERECHO 371
(Caceres, Flores, Saldana & Villanueva eds., 2005).
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E. Hegemonic Legality
By the term hegemonic legality, I refer to two different phenom-
ena. The first refers to the hegemony of developed country law
and jurisprudence within the prevailing paradigm of transnational-
ism. This does not mean that U.S. and other international scholars
are inappropriately or uninformedly forcing their beliefs on Latin
Americans. This discursive construct rather is shared by some
scholars located in both the United States and Latin America. And
the particular notions or limitations described here are equally
common.
Not all interests affected by legal struggle in Latin America, how-
ever, have equal access to transnational platforms. 61 As a result,
transnational legal operators may sustain a somewhat insular dia-
logue. 16 2 Highlighting the agency and contribution of specific
Latin Americans within these circuits may be a positive step; it does
not address, however, the representational and political imbal-
ances reinforced by the same transnationalism. In fact, some have
suggested that the benefits of transnationalism are limited to Latin
Americans who have studied in the United States or who share
other connections with U.S. experts. 163 Moreover, access to trans-
national circuits may be circumscribed by the interests and con-
cerns of the participants with the greater resources. The point
could be made that transnationalism, rather than introducing
more resource-rich actors into legal arenas in other locales, instead
draws adherents from the periphery into the political and intellec-
tual questions of interest at the center. In any case, Dezelay and
Garth have already chronicled how Latin American legal scholars
are often able to parlay their connections at the center into power-
ful interventions in their home legal-political arenas.' 64 They, for
example, might harness the clout of relationships at Wisconsin or
capitalize on the stature of studies at Harvard. Whether or not
161. See DEZE[AY & GARTH, supra note 115, at 32-58.
162. See Robert M. Levine, Pesquisas: Fontes e Materiais de Arquivos, Instituicies Relevantes,
Abordagens, in 0 BRASIL DOS BRASILIANISTAS, UM GUIA DOS ESTUDOS SOBRE o BRASIL NOS
ESTADOS UNIDOS 1945-2000, at 57, 62 (R. Barbosa, M. Eakin & P. de Almeida eds., 2002)
(claiming that "Brazilianists" in the humanities and social sciences only began to collabo-
rate with Brazilian counterparts in the late 1970's: "Antes dos anos 60, era raro que intelec-
tuais americanos se envolvessem em debates serios som seus colegas brasileiros." At the
same time, Levine notes-in response to criticisms of Brazilianists as U.S. agents or having
a Brazil-specific agenda-"O novo 'brasilianista,' por mais brilhante e bom-sucedido que
seja, comporta-se como qualquer professor asistente do sistema universitirio norte-ameri-
cano, isto 6, desenvolve uma sintonia com as orienta 6es e enfoques de sua disciplina." ).
163. See DEZELAY & GARTH, supra note 115, at 42-47.
164. Id. at 34.
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first-world sponsors actually turn their attention to engage the local
specificity of legal controversies in the periphery, their imprimatur
strengthens the hand of the cosmopolitan Latin American legal
actor in "palace wars" waged at home. 165
The addition of more and more varied transnationalists to the
field may lessen some of these effects. Numbers are still quite
small. Then again, as already noted, additional adepts from Latin
America are no automatic antidote to the epistemic disconnects
identified here. Many of the conventional modes are commonly
shared by U.S. and Latin American proponents alike. Moreover, at
U.S. institutions, individuals from abroad are faced with all the
same limitations. They must still appeal to the established leaders
in their areas, student editors at law journals, accepted parameters
of review for promotion and tenure, and all the same entrenched
difficulties identified throughout this Essay. In these ways, the
hegemony of developed country and particularly U.S.-supported
legal forms frame the range of communication and dominant con-
cepts advanced.
A second meaning intended by the hegemonic legality reference
is an attitude not often openly expressed but still close to the sur-
face. It is the expectation that Latin American states are geopoliti-
cally subordinate to U.S. power. This idea may be viewed as a
hyperrealist position or simply cold cynicism. Such a perspective,
however, maintains that regardless of the various positions that
may be supported in the periphery, U.S. policies and U.S.-backed
interests will prevail over other contenders. Thus, on any substan-
tial matter, contrary positions or alternatives advanced by Latin
Americans-expressed in the form of legal rules, policies, or insti-
tutions-but not backed by significant U.S. support are ultimately
irrelevant. If the stakes are high enough, contrary positions either
will be defeated or, if enacted, will be dejure or de facto displaced.
Under this assumption, the broader local vernacular is thus sim-
ply not worth engaging. In fact, it provides an automatic answer to
provocative questions such as, "Why do we need to know what
Latin Americans think about law, anyway?" This query might sound
like a caricature invented here for purposes of dramatic effect. But
it is in fact a question I have heard in this same form and in other
indirect ways. The following passage is an extreme example:
What concerns me is the fact that for many of our Latin-Ameri-
canists the intensive study of their subject merely kindles their
subconscious hostility to it .... For us [North Americans] the
165. See id. at 44-47.
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Latin-American is the peon or pistolero, and not-as he might be
for occasional Frenchmen-the poet or jurist.166
In any case, for the variety of reasons explained here and surely
others I have missed, the discursive dimension of law in Latin
America is underappreciated. It is afflicted by a "loss of faith," as
that concept has been elaborated by Duncan Kennedy in relation
to rights talk and legal reasoning in the United States.167 Kennedy,
speaking in the context of the United States, identifies specific
experiences provoking faithlessness in the rational coherence of
rights, leading him to assert that "[i]f you have lost your faith in the
mediating power of legal rights discourse, having come to experi-
ence it as no more than a form of ideologically permeable policy
talk, then you are not likely to see . . . forms of lay [rights and
legal] discourse as any different." 168 In a different yet parallel fash-
ion, one of the "limitations" of legal transnationalism identified in
this Essay can also be described as a sort of faithlessness in "law
talk" internal to Latin America. Significantly for Kennedy, faith-
lessness in law's legitimation, however, is different than faithless-
ness in legal authority: "[faithlessness in rights or legal reasoning]
might mean loss of faith in law, or in legal authority, as well.
But... the critique and loss of faith in legal rights reasoning does
not necessarily imply a loss of faith in normativity in general. '" 169
Shedding a different light on the question, Doris Sommer has
explained and endorsed the benefits of sustaining a "double-con-
sciousness.' 70 Double-consciousness is meant to describe the abil-
ity to participate in at least two different cultural paradigms at the
same time. 171 The concept can also be applied to the different dis-
cursive contexts straddled by transnational legal work. Sommer
believes that "[d] ouble consciousness may be our best cultural safe-
guard for democratic practice, because doubleness won't allow the
meanness of one thought, one striving, one measure of value."1 72
This may be something to keep in mind.
166. Richard M. Morse, The Strange Career of "Latin-American Studies," 356 ANNALS AM.
AcAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 106, 107, 110 (1964).
167. Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/
LEFT CRITIQUE 194, 178 (Brown & Halley eds., 2002).
168. Id. at 211.
169. Id. at 197 (emphasis in original).
170. See generally Doris Sommer, A Vindication of Double Consciousness, in A COMPANION
TO POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES 165 (H.Schwarz & S. Ray eds., 2000).
171. See id. at 165.
172. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The current practices of much U.S.-Latin American legal trans-
nationalism are inflected in particular ways. These are certainly
afflicted by all the normal obstacles attendant to comparative work.
But beyond such constraints, certain epistemic disjunctures also
impact the field. Outwardly, these differences appear in a number
of ways. For example, law in Latin America is anthropologized.
The prevalence of extralegal practices in the region is taken as evi-
dence of a different cultural conception of law, rather than simply
part of the modernist system of law in place. Certain beliefs and
inherent contradictions of law have become permanent diagnoses
and inescapable conclusions. As such, "Kelsen," "the un-rule of
law," and "lack of independence," along with some others, are
often accepted as the definitive word. Legal debate within the
region appears to present an impenetrable house of mirrors. Con-
cepts of legal theory-common in the United States-are found
missing in the region. Law always appears to be behind, possibly
because of these concepts' refraction through civilian legal termi-
nology or their particular configuration in local contexts. Addi-
tionally, a self-reinforcing practice of limited engagement and an
unstated belief in the dominance of the global center all contrib-
ute to the current version of legal transnationalism.
The argument here is not that transnationalism should embody
a single, correct form or set of practices. Nor is the point that
transnationalists must engage national or doctrinal legal debates in
the same terms. Certainly, the latter represent only some of the
many different approaches to questions of legal governance. By
way of example, advocates of legal pluralism usually sidestep
detailed analysis of state law in favor of defending separate jurisdic-
tions and autochthonous community norms. Critical legal scholars
reject liberal legal reform and instead challenge the internal con-
sistency and systemic effects of modern legal systems. Identity crit-
ics, in turn, advance liberal gains on their own terms and,
simultaneously, denounce the racial subordination produced by
current laws and institutions. These various approaches are not
involved in one sole debate and do not necessarily address a single
or unitary audience. It should be noted, though, that these differ-
ent approaches may also fall liable to some of the same criticisms
described in this Essay.
In any case, the currently dominant mode of U.S.-Latin Ameri-
can legal transnationalism is both privileged and played on the
stage of reforming state law and legal institutions. As such, it can-
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not be easily dismissed. Troublingly, its practice forcefully skews
national legal-political debate in the region and instrumentally nar-
rows the imaginable array of local policy options. Moreover, its
conventions contribute to the frustration felt with legal institutions
in the region. Such limitations, however, are not necessary conse-
quences of transnational engagement. Identifying the fault lines-
as this Essay has proposed to do-may begin to transcend some of
the more counterproductive features. Possibly, once pretences and
fantasies about the law are eased away, we can begin to advance
projects and beliefs transnationally in ways that can reinforce law-
ness throughout the region.
